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Effects of Market Default Risk on  
Index Option Risk-Neutral Moments 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the relative importance of market default risk in explaining the time variation 
of the S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral moments. The results demonstrate that 
market default risk is positively (negatively) related to the index risk-neutral volatility and 
skewness (kurtosis). These relations are robust in the presence of other factors relevant to the 
dynamics and microstructure nature of the spot and option markets. Overall, this study sheds 
light on a set of economic determinants which help to understand the daily evolution of the 
S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral distributions. Our findings offer explanations of 
why theoretical predictions of option pricing models are not consistent with what is observed 
in practice and provide support that market default risk is important to asset pricing.   
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1. Introduction 
Firm level default risk encompasses vital information of true economic activity 
regarding a firm’s ability to generate enough operating cash flow to meet its future debt 
obligations. Default risk captures financial health at the firm level and, when aggregated at the 
economy level, should reflect market-wide economic prospects. For example, when consumer 
confidence is high, aggregate consumption should be higher, contributing to higher operating 
cash flows and lower levels of default risk for all firms. Default risk is also lower when 
macroeconomic conditions allow credit expansion that could subsequently stimulate 
economic growth. Such claims are supported by empirical evidence. Denis and Denis (1995), 
for instance, show that default risk is linked to broader economic factors, such as 
macroeconomic and regulatory developments and upcoming events in the fixed income and 
money markets (i.e., the collapse of the junk bond market and the credit crunch of 1990). 
Chen (1991) and Chan et al. (1998), document that a market default premium index is an 
indicator of the current health of the economy and relates to the future growth of economic 
activity. Vassalou and Xing (2004) document that market-wide default risk varies greatly with 
the business cycle and that it increases substantially during recessions. Considering all prior 
evidence together, if default risk is systematic and sheds light on particular market-wide 
economic issues, then, immediately, this information should also be impounded in option 
prices. Indeed, this study’s empirical findings support the notion that a market default 
likelihood index that is computed by aggregating firm level default risk information, helps 
explain time variation in the daily risk-neutral distributions of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
500 Index options. 
 The literature that investigates the relation between default risk and implied volatility 
skew is rather limited and mainly concentrated on equity options. On theoretical grounds, 
Toft and Prucyk (1997) show that the presence of leverage can give rise to a monotonically 
downward implied volatility curve, whereas the steepness of the smile depends on the level of 
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leverage.
1
 More recently, Geske and Zhou (2012) show that the leverage effect causes option-
implied volatility to be both stochastic and inversely related to the level of the asset price. On 
empirical grounds, Dennis and Mayhew (2002), as well as Taylor et al. (2009), document that 
firms with more leverage have less negative risk-neutral skewness. It is therefore intriguing to 
investigate whether the relation between leverage, as captured by the firm’s default risk, and 
the shape of the implied volatility curve, as captured by higher-order risk-neutral moments, 
extends to the aggregate level as well. Such research for S&P 500 Index options is rather 
unexploited and merits further analysis. We primarily address this gap by carrying out an 
empirical analysis in the period 1998– 2007. 
 By and large, the findings of the abovementioned studies suggest a strong link 
between firm leverage and higher-order risk-neutral moments as implied by equity options. 
Then, an obvious question immediately emerges: since we already know that there is a link 
between leverage and the risk-neutral moments for individual stocks, so why shouldn’t there 
be (exactly) the same link at the aggregate level as well? Prior research shows that the pricing 
structure of individual equity options is flatter compared with that of the market index. In 
particular, Bakshi et al. (2003) document that individual stocks are mildly left skewed (or 
even positively skewed), while index return distributions are heavily and persistently left 
skewed (see also, Bollen and Whaley, (2004)). Bakshi et al. (2003) note that as long as the 
idiosyncratic returns of individual stocks are less negatively skewed than the market, one can 
expect to find a difference in the risk-neutral skewness of stock options compared to those of 
index options. This merely reflects the fact that the economic sources of risk-neutral moments 
can be different between equity and index options. Hence, empirical relations that may hold 
true in the case of equity options should not necessarily extend in the same manner to index 
options. Investigating the link between market default risk and risk-neutral distributions as 
implied by the S&P 500 Index options stays an open research question whose investigation is 
likely to be useful to both scholars and practitioners.  
                                                 
1
 The terms implied volatility skew(s), implied volatility curve(s), and risk-neutral distribution(s) are 
used interchangeably in this study. 
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 We proxy market default risk with a market default likelihood index (MDLI) that is 
computed by aggregating the daily probability-to-default values for all non-financial firms 
included in the S&P 500 Index portfolio, where firm-specific probability-to-default values are 
computed with the Merton (1974) distance-to-default (DD) model. Overall, we find strong 
and robust evidence that the MDLI measure is an important economic determinant of the 
daily S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral volatility. Figlewski and Wang (2000), 
using monthly returns data and quarterly book values of debt, find a leverage effect for the 
S&P 100 Index options, but only in down markets. In contrast, based on the MDLI that, by 
nature, is a market-based proxy of leverage, we find a pronounced leverage effect, even when 
the S&P 500 Index is rising. Furthermore, we examine how market default risk relates to the 
index risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. More importantly, though, we present evidence to 
support the notion that the relations reported at the firm level between leverage and the shape 
of equity option-implied volatility curves (in particular risk-neutral skewness) extend in the 
same manner to the index option-implied volatility curves under our MDLI measure.  
 In addition and equally important, we investigate other economic determinants that 
may affect the risk-neutral distributions of the S&P 500 Index. Prior literature documents that 
the shape of index-implied volatility curves is significantly affected by economic variables 
not included in the milestone Black–Scholes (1973) model or other elaborated parametric 
models that incorporate additional risk factors (Peña et al. (1999); Amin et al. (2004); Bollen 
and Whaley (2004); Han (2008)).
2
 In that respect, along with the MDLI, we also find 
evidence that economic determinants relevant to: (i) market uncertainty, (ii) trading activity 
and the direction of the underlying asset’s return, (iii) options trading activity and hedging 
pressure, and (iv) the persistence of the implied volatility skew, affect the risk-neutral 
distributions of the S&P 500 Index options. 
 The main empirical evidence of our study suggests that market default risk, as 
captured by the MDLI measure, is a key economic determinant of the S&P 500 Index option-
                                                 
2
 Recent developments in this area relate to option pricing models that admit stochastic volatility or 
stochastic volatility and jump risk factors (Heston (1993); Bakshi et al. (1997); Pan (2002)).  
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implied risk-neutral distributions. In that sense, it should affect the market’s perceptions 
about the future growth of the economy and may also have a significant effect on the shape of 
the physical distribution of future market returns. The findings of our study also have 
practical implications: as suggested by Shimko (2009), the recent financial crisis has 
highlighted the importance of identifying new risk indicators, such as the MDLI measure 
proposed in this study, which can be used by investors to forecast potential market downturns 
and adjust their investment decisions accordingly. 
 The following section explains how to compute the MDLI measure and discusses the 
methodology used to extract the risk-neutral moments. Then, Section 3 reviews the different 
datasets. Section 4 discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Methodology: Market Default Likelihood Index and Risk-Neutral Moments 
 We assert that probability-to-default computed via the Merton DD model is an 
adequate proxy of firm-specific default risk for computing the MDLI measure. First, the 
Merton DD model is parsimonious and estimated using market variables that are forward 
looking and reflect investors’ expectations about future economic prospects. This is most 
relevant for our analysis, since information embedded in option data is forwarding looking as 
well. Second, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) support that the 
model is able to capture timely information about default risk faster than traditional rating 
models and econometric approaches that rely on accounting ratio-based data (see also Du and 
Hansz (2009)). Third, the Merton DD model can produce default risk estimates on a daily 
basis, for every firm in our sample and at any given point in time. Moreover, the Merton DD 
model is neither a time- nor a sample-specific estimator, since it can be estimated 
independently for any firm.
3
 Such capability coincides with the needs of our analysis. 
                                                 
3
 Companies included in the S&P 500 Index portfolio operate in leading industries of the U.S. 
economy and, by nature, have very high market capitalization, high financial viability, and high prices 
per share. Campbell et al. (2008) report that financially distressed firms tend to be relatively small, 
have severely low financial viability, and tend to trade at very low prices per share. Therefore, it is 
highly unlikely that traditional econometric models that are typically developed on a sample of 
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 Description of the Merton DD model is presented in Appendix A. As illustrated in 
Eq. (A.7), the firm-specific probability-to-default value, Merton , is computed after applying 
the normal cumulative distribution, N(.), to the distance-to-default measure, DD, as follows: 
)(Merton DD . 
DD as illustrated in Eq. (A.6) is a measure of the difference between the asset value of the 
firm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value. 
This study solves Eqs. (A.3) and (A.5) simultaneously via a numerical nonlinear root-finding 
algorithm following the implementation of the Merton DD model as in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). We do that for two reasons. First, the simultaneous estimation scheme is 
straightforward and is considered to be a sufficient approach for the given problem. Second, 
and more importantly, the empirical results of Bharath and Shumway (2008) support that the 
simultaneous approach has better out-of-sample predicting performance for the probability-
to-default than a complicated iterative procedure that uses historical returns data to calibrate 
the model. 
 
2.1 Market Default Likelihood Index (MDLI) 
 We consider three alternative cases where Eqs. (A.3) and (A.5) are solved 
simultaneously, but every time a different expected return on the firm’s total assets, V , is 
used to compute the probability-to-default value, Merton , as illustrated in Eq. (A.7). The first 
two cases are similar to the alternative estimators considered by Bharath and Shumway 
(2008). The first predictor is EV
rMerton , where the expected return on the firm’s assets is equal 
to the firm’s stock return over the previous year, Er .
4
 The second estimator is FV
rMerton , where 
                                                                                                                                            
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms would provide default risk estimates superior to the Merton DD 
model in our sample. 
 
4
 Bharath and Shumway (2008) use Er  to compute a naïve probability-to-default measure (denoted as 
naiveπ  in their study). The naïve estimator approximates the functional form of the Merton DD 
probability-to-default and avoids solving any equations or estimating any difficult quantities in its 
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the prevailing risk-free rate, Fr , is used as the expected return on the firm’s assets. This 
default risk estimator resembles closely to the estimator denoted as 
simulπMerton  in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). The third estimator, denoted by GV
r
Merton , explores the fact that the 
expected return on the firm’s assets can be expressed as a function of hedge parameters (i.e., 
Greek letters) computed via Eq. (A.3) (see Appendix B for the analytic formulas to determine 
Gr ). This estimator has not been considered by prior studies, such as those of Bharath and 
Shumway (2008), Campbell et al. (2008), and Vassalou and Xing (2004). 
We proxy the daily market default risk with the MDLI measure that is computed by 
aggregating firm-specific probability-to-default values as follows: 
                                MDLI: ),(
1
)(
1
MertonMerton ti
n
t
t
VV
n
i
q
t
q 



  ,  (1) 
where tn  denotes the number of non-financial firms included in the S&P 500 Index portfolio 
on day t and ),(Merton ti
qV   represents the probability-to-default value computed for firm i on 
day t using the Merton DD model, with },,{ GFE rrrq .  
We exclude all financial firms because capital structure and leverage time evolution 
for such firms have a totally different context compared to non-financial (i.e., commercial and 
industrial) firms. First, high leverage which is normal for financial firms does not necessarily 
imply high financial distress as with the case of non-financial firms where high leverage 
mostly relates to high financial distress positions (see Fama and French, 1992). Second, it is 
common to observe the liabilities of non-financial firms to increase as they become more 
distressed while the liabilities of financial institutions show a tendency to decrease as these 
firms become more distressed. Therefore, by using only the non-financial firms included in 
the S&P 500 portfolio we rely on a homogeneous sample of capital structure choices which 
allows us to get an informative proxy for the aggregated market default risk level that would 
better link default rates on the macroeconomic state of the economy.  
                                                                                                                                            
construction. Without presenting the empirical evidence, all results we reach in our analysis are robust 
and remain unaltered when we employ the Bharath and Shumway (2008) naïve estimator.   
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2.2 Risk-Neutral Moments of the S&P 500 Index Returns 
 Bakshi et al. (2003) provide a model-free procedure that allows one to extract the 
volatility, skewness, and kurtosis of the risk-neutral return distribution from a set of out-the-
money call and put options. Higher-order risk-neutral moments are expressed in terms of the 
prices of payoffs that depend on future stock prices, namely a quadratic, a cubic, and a quartic 
contract. This method has gained significant recognition (e.g., Dennis and Mayhew (2002); 
Han (2008); Chang et al. (2012); Neumann and Skiadopoulos (2013)) since it allows one to 
extract the implied risk-neutral moments without the need to impose any specific assumptions 
on the underlying asset’s stochastic process. The resulting formulas for extracting the risk-
neutral moments are given in Appendix C. 
 Estimation of the risk-neutral moments follows previous literature, particularly the 
approach in Chang et al. (2012). Risk-neutral moments are computed by integrating over 
moneyness. Yet, in practice, options with a certain τ-period maturity are only observed at 
discrete price intervals. Therefore, each trading day t, to obtain a τ-period continuum of 
implied volatilities, we interpolate the available ones using a cubic spline across the 
moneyness levels SK / , always confining the interpolated values between the maximum and 
minimum available strike prices (where K  is the option strike price and S  is the S&P 500 
Index spot value). For moneyness levels outside the available strike prices, we adopt a 
horizontal extrapolation where implied volatility for the lowest (highest) available strike price 
is used for moneyness levels below (above) the available ones. This procedure allows us to 
generate 1000 τ-period implied volatilities for SK /  between 0.01 and 3.00. 
 In the spirit of prior studies (Dennis and Mayhew (2002); Han (2008); Neumann and 
Skiadopoulos (2013)), to avoid the effect of the shrinking time to maturity on the daily 
evolution of risk-neutral moments as time goes by, we base our analysis on the 30-, 60- and 
91-day constant maturity S&P 500 risk-neutral volatility, skewness, and kurtosis. To extract 
the constant maturity moments, for any of the 1000 τ-period implied volatilities computed 
from the previous step, we apply cubic splines to interpolate across volatilities in the time 
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dimension with a target maturity of either 30, 60, or 91 days. This results in a (new) set of 
1000 implied volatilities with the desired maturity, which are subsequently converted into a 
fine grid of out-of-money call ( 1/ SK ) and out-of-money put ( 1/ SK ) option prices.5 
Finally, the fine grid of option prices is then used to compute the option-implied risk-neutral 
moments based on formulas (C.4)–(C.6) using the trapezoidal numerical integration. To 
perform these calculations we use all available option data with maturities of less than 180 
days. Only option maturities that include at least two out-of-money calls and two out-of-
money puts are used. In addition, if the desired maturity is below the smallest available τ-
period maturity, the constant maturity implied moments are not computed. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Merton DD Model - Firm Level Data 
 We use firms in the Compustat Industrial files to obtain quarterly accounting data, 
and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to obtain daily stock return data. To 
estimate the market default probabilities, we find the set of firms listed in the S&P 500 Index 
at the end of each calendar year and exclude all the financial ones (Standard Industrial 
Classification codes 6000–6999). We also make sure that the firms’ CRSP permanent 
identifiers do not change, to avoid using companies that were involved in significant 
corporate events. Moreover, we eliminate firm observations with a negative book value of 
equity. 
 Similar to Bharath and Shumway (2008) we estimate equity volatility, E , to be the 
annualized percent standard deviation of daily returns using the prior year’s stock data, while 
for risk-free rate, Fr , we use the one-year Treasury constant maturity rate obtained from 
Federal Reserve. The market value of each firm’s equity, E , is computed by multiplying the 
firm’s shares outstanding by its stock price at the end of each day. Following Vassalou and 
                                                 
5
 We use the Black–Scholes model to convert implied volatilities into option prices. As noted by Chang 
et al. (2012), the use of the Black–Scholes model serves only as a “translation mechanism” and does 
not imply that the model correctly prices options.  
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Xing (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008), we define the book value of debt, F , to be 
the debt in current liabilities (Compustat data item 45) plus one-half of the long-term debt 
(Compustat data item 51), while the time forecasting horizon is set to be one year.
6
 Before 
calculating the firms’ assets market value, V , and volatility, V , we follow Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) and winsorize all observations at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of the 
associated cross-sectional distribution. Finally, to avoid look-ahead bias, we align each firm’s 
fiscal year appropriately with the calendar year and then lag accounting data by two months. 
Unlike many prior studies, this treatment ensures that all accounting data needed for the 
construction of the market default risk measures are publicly available before each estimation 
case. The final data set used with the Merton DD model has 994,538 firm–days with 
complete data. 
 
3.2 Options Data 
 We consider all S&P 500 Index call and put options for the period 1998–2007 (2,514 
trading days) obtained from Commodity Systems Inc. We use the midpoint of the option bid–
ask spread since, as noted by Dumas et al. (1998), using bid–ask midpoints rather than trade 
prices reduces noise in the cross-sectional estimation of implied volatilities. Option time to 
maturity is computed assuming 252 days per year. We apply cubic splines on one-, three-, 
six-, and 12-month constant maturity T-bill rates to match each case with a continuous 
interest rate that best corresponds to the option’s maturity. In addition, the S&P 500 Index 
level is adjusted for dividends (collected from Datastream). 
 The final dataset is created after applying the following filtering rules (Bakshi et al. 
(1997); Han (2008); Andreou et al. (2014)). First, all observations that have zero trading 
volume are eliminated, since they do not represent actual trades. Second, options that violate 
either the lower or the upper arbitrage option pricing bounds are also eliminated. Likewise, 
                                                 
6
 We follow Campbell et al. (2008) for all cases where F  cannot be estimated from the data. 
Specifically, if F  is missing, we use TLTLFmedianF *)/( , where TL  stands for total liabilities 
(Compustat data item 54). When 0F , we use TLTLFmedianF *)/( , where now we calculate the 
median only for small but nonzero values of F  ( 01.00  F ).     
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options with price quotes of less than 1.0 index point, with implied volatility lower than 5% 
or higher than 70%, and with midpoint price lower than the bid–ask spread difference are 
excluded. Third, all options with less than five or more than 253 trading days to expiration are 
discarded to avoid cases where trading illiquidity may be present. Finally, only observations 
with S/K between 0.75 and 1.25 are included in the analysis. The final dataset has a total of 
373,077 contracts, of which 172,737 are call options and 200,340 are put options. 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
4.1 Alternative Market Default Likelihood Measures for the S&P 500 Index 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for variables involved in the estimation of the 
different measures of default risk. Panel A of Table 1 provides information computed by 
using all firms’ daily observations, while Panel B demonstrates the alternative MDLI 
measures computed by aggregating on a daily basis the probability-to-default values across 
firms using Eq. (1). There are many interesting observations to make from this table. First, 
the mean equity value of all firms included in our sample is E = 20,126.9, the mean book 
value of the debt is F = 2,272.3 (thus F / E =0.113), and the mean value of net income over 
the book value of total assets, TANI / , is 0.015. The corresponding figures reported in 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) are E = 808.80 and F = 229.92 (thus F / E =0.284) with 
TANI / = -1.08. Our point estimate for the mean value of EV
r


Merton  is 2.2%, which is almost 
five times smaller than the estimate of 10.95% reported in Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
Apparently the differences in these figures can be explained by the fact that compared to the 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) study, our sample spans a different time period with the 
incidence of bankruptcy to be significantly different between the two studies (see also 
supporting evidence of this argument in Table I of Campbell et al., 2008). Our point estimates 
for the mean value of the other two MDLI measures are significantly different from one 
another and much lower than EV
r


Merton . Specifically, the value of 
FV rμ Merton  is 0.3%, while the 
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value of GV
r


Merton  is 1.1%. These discrepancies reflect the mean differences of the alterative 
measures used to proxy the expected return on the firm’s assets, V . 
[Table 1, here] 
Table 2 Panel A reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between the daily levels of the 
alternative MDLI measures; it also exhibits their relation to the level of the S&P 500 Index 
(SP500). Likewise, Panel B tabulates the correlation coefficients regarding the daily changes 
of alternative MDLI measures and index returns (RET). It is evident that all MDLI measures 
preserve a significant negative relation to the contemporaneous index level and return. Such a 
relation is expected by virtue of the leverage effect (Figlewski and Wang (2000)). In support 
of this, Figure 1 depicts a graphical representation of the relation between the market implied 
value of debt to market‐value of equity (i.e., market Debt-to-Equity ratio) plotted against the 
level of the S&P 500 index. The firm level market-value of debt is determined as the 
difference between the market-value of the firm’s total assets (V  ― derived daily as the 
solution of the Merton DD model when estimating EV
rMerton  for each firm observation) and the 
market-value of its equity ( E ― computed by multiplying the firm’s shares outstanding by its 
stock price at the end of each day). Based on the assumptions behind the estimated Merton 
DD model, values of debt presented in this graph reflect the market-values of debt in current 
liabilities plus one-half of the long-term debt obligations. As such, the market-value of Debt-
to-Equity ratio ranges from a minimum of 8.47% in August of 2000, to a maximum of 17.8% 
in October of 2002. It is evident that the two time series in Figure 1 tend to move in the 
opposite direction generating a correlation coefficient of -0.885, as expected under the 
leverage effect. Moreover, Figure 2 depicts a graphical representation between the market 
Debt-to-Equity ratio plotted against the MDLI measure, EV
r


Merton . This figure demonstrates 
that EV
r


Merton  tends to move in lockstep with the market Debt-to-Equity ratio. Untabulated 
statistics also reveal that the correlation coefficient between the market Debt-to-Equity ratio 
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and EV
r


Merton  is 0.568. These empirical observations square with the notion that market 
default risk as captured by the MDLI measure is a reasonable proxy of market leverage.7   
[Table 2, here] 
[Figures 1 & 2, here] 
Moreover, in the spirit of Denis and Denis (1995) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), 
among others, we expect a negative relation between market default risk and stock prices 
when EV
r


Merton  reflects market’s expectations regarding the future growth/state of the 
economy. Empirical support for this expectation is presented in Figure 3, which plots the 
daily values of EV
r


Merton , 
FV r

Merton , and 
GV r

Merton  against the S&P 500 Index. For instance, it is 
interesting enough to observe that in March 2003 the value of EV
r


Merton  is above 10% while 
after July 2003 its value drops significantly below 2%. Evidently, the rapid decline in the 
value of the MDLI measure is followed by a long-lasting bullish period for the S&P 500 
Index. Moreover, it is also intriguing to observe that while from August 2007 to December 
2007 the S&P 500 Index presented a moderate decline in value of less than 10%, EV
r


Merton  
was increasing at an exponential rate, rising from 0.05% early in August 2007 to about 2% by 
the end of 2007. The astonishing increase in the value of market default risk during this 
period may have been an early sign in anticipation of the financial crisis that would hit the 
U.S. capital market a couple of months later. 
[Figure 3, here] 
As can be seen from Table 2 (Panel A) and Figure 3, all alternative MDLI measures 
are significantly positively related to one another, with correlations well above 0.763. 
                                                 
7
 We also proxy for the S&P 500 Debt-to-Equity ratio by computing the aggregate book‐value of debt 
to market‐value of equity ratio as defined in Figlewski and Wang (2000). To compute the Debt-to-
Equity ratio in this case we follow similar treatments as in Figlewski and Wang (2000) using quarterly 
balance sheet information from Compustat and daily stock prices from CRSP. In particular, book value 
of debt is defined as debt in current liabilities (Compustat data item 45) plus long-term debt (Compustat 
data item 51) aggregated for the 500 firms in the S&P Index divided by the daily market capitalization 
of the index. The correlation coefficient between the Merton and the Figlewski and Wang proxy for 
market Debt-to-Equity ratio is 0.823. Moreover, the correlation between the Figlewski and Wang 
market Debt-to-Equity ratio and EV rMerton  is 0.786. 
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Overall, the alternative measures seem to subsume similar levels of information regarding the 
market default risk time evolution. For this reason, the subsequent analysis focuses only on 
the use of EV
r


Merton . Bharath and Shumway (2008) report that this measure preserves the 
highest out-of-sample accuracy among the different versions of credit risk estimators they 
consider. Nevertheless, the results reported subsequently are qualitatively the same, both in 
reported directional signs and statistical significance, regardless of whether GV
r


Merton  or 
FV r

Merton  is used, instead (detailed results are not reported here for brevity but are available 
upon request). 
 
4.2 Option Sample and Risk-Neutral Moments 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the options dataset. Moneyness classes are created 
using options’ delta values defined similarly as in Bollen and Whaley (2004) (information for 
the construction of the moneyness classes is tabulated in Table 3). Implied volatilities in 
general decrease monotonically across the delta categories as the exercise price rises relative 
to the index level, with the only exception being deep-in-the-money puts whose implied 
volatility is comparable to that of the deep-out-of-the-money puts. Therefore, while for call 
options a volatility smirk pattern is apparent, put options’ implied volatilities are more likely 
to exhibit a smile pattern. Due to the possible existence of limits to arbitrage, market makers’ 
supply curves are upward sloping and therefore, they demand high premia for taking short 
positions in deep-in-the-money puts during periods of negative market momentum. In this 
respect, limits to arbitrage can allow a volatility smile to emerge in the cross-section of put 
options. Finally, from Table 3 we observe option trading volumes to present patterns similar 
to those reported in Bollen and Whaley (2004). Specifically, at- and out-the-money options 
have higher levels of trading volume and lower bid–ask spreads than for in-the-money cases.  
[Table 3, here] 
Table 4 tabulates summary statistics for the 30-, 60- and 91-day risk-neutral moments 
for 2,514 trading days covering the period 1998–2007 (Panel A). Since some of our key 
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determinants are utilizing index and options trading volume, following the recommendations 
in the study of Lo and Wang (2000), the sample period is further split into two five-year   
(sub-)periods. Lo and Wang (2000) try different methods for detrending trading volume and 
conclude that they either fail to remove serial correlation or they destroy the time series 
properties of the raw data. They assert that short measurement periods should be considered 
when analyzing trading volume due to the nonstationarity of the variable. Based on this 
empirical observation, Bollen and Whaley (2004) carry out their study using six years of data. 
Moreover, splitting the data in two periods allows us to model the possibility of changing 
relations between the dependent and independent variables across the two periods. Therefore, 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the two periods, with the first covering 1,256 days 
from 1998 to 2002 (Panel B) and the second covering 1,258 days from 2003 to 2007 (Panel 
C). Finally, Panel D reports the difference in the mean values between the two periods.  
As shown in the table, 30-day risk-neutral volatility, 
30MFIV , varies from 0.092 to 
0.460 with a mean value of 0.199. The respective minimum, maximum and mean values for 
60MFIV  ( 91MFIV ) are 0.104 (0.111), 0.434 (0.431) and 0.206 (0.207). Risk-neutral 
skewness, 
30SKEW , is negative throughout the full period with a sample minimum 
(maximum) value of -2.466 (-0.407), whereas there is consistently excess kurtosis, with the 
lowest value of 
30KURT  equal to 3.238. The respective minimum (maximum) values for 
60SKEW  and 91SKEW  are -2.493 (-0.598) and -2.341 (-0.424). The respective minimum 
(maximum) values for 
60KURT  and 91KURT  are 3.101 (11.546) and 2.881 (9.618). There is a 
notable difference in the risk-neutral volatility between the two periods. Moreover, the second 
period exhibits on average a more negative risk-neutral skewness and higher excess kurtosis. 
The above evidence indicates that in both periods the implied distribution of the S&P 500 
index returns do not conform to the Black-Scholes theoretical assumption of asset returns 
normality. The negative risk-neutral skewness in both periods is indicative of persistent 
negatively sloped (i.e., steeper) implied volatility curves, while the excess risk-neutral 
kurtosis is indicative of pronounced convexity; overall, the reported evidence of both periods 
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is consistent with prior research (e.g., Bakshi et al. (1997, 2003); Dennis and Mayhew (2002); 
Han (2008); Andreou et al. (2014)) that advocate the existence of an implied volatility 
smile/smirk anomaly in the equity and index options. Nevertheless, 30-, 60- and 91-day risk-
neutral skewness and kurtosis are more pronounced in the second period (i.e., skewness is 
more negative and kurtosis is higher) which coincides with evidence in Bollen and Whaley 
(2004) according to which the slope of the option implied volatility smile could change 
dramatically from period to period (see also, Andreou et al. (2010)). It is also noteworthy that 
all differences in the mean values of the risk-neutral moments are statistically significant 
across the two periods. In essence, the second period reveals a more noticeable index option 
volatility smile anomaly which creates greater challenge in identifying the key determinants 
that drive the daily evolution of risk-neutral distributions. Despite, following prior literature 
(e.g., Toft and Prucyk (1997), Geske and Zhou (2012)) that examines the relation between 
leverage and (firm or index) risk-neutral skewness, we would expect the steepness of the 
smile to strongly depend on the level of leverage; in this vein, the relation between the MDLI 
measure and the S&P 500 index risk-neutral moments is expected to be more prevalent in the 
second period. As we show later in our regression investigation, in the second period of our 
analysis, we find stronger evidence that the market default risk is a primary economic 
determinant of the S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral distributions. 
Subsequent analysis is carried out only for the 60- and 91-day risk-neutral moments. 
The 30-day results are very similar to those for 60-day and 91-day risk-neutral moments and 
therefore are omitted for brevity. All omitted results are available, however, upon request. 
[Table 4, here] 
 
4.3 Default Risk and Variation in Option-Related Variables 
We start our analysis by investigating whether groups of days with different market 
default risk levels convey significantly different information with respect to certain option-
related variables. As explained below, to perform this analysis we form three groups of data 
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by pooling together days where EV
r


Merton  exhibits low, medium and high values. It is true, 
however, that EV
r


Merton  is highly correlated with the: i) contemporaneous S&P 500 Index 
level, tSP500  (pairwise correlation equal to -0.409), ii) contemporaneous 30-day historical 
volatility, 
Hist
t,30  (pairwise correlation equal to 0.698), and iii) one-day lagged Chicago Board 
Options Exchange’s (CBOE) VIX level, 1VIX t  (pairwise correlation equal to 0.705). 
Therefore, to isolate the net information content of the MDLI measure, we remove the effect 
of tSP500 , 
Hist
t,30 , and 1VIX t  from 
EV r
t
Merton,  using the following set of regressions 
estimated over the whole period: 
167.0,SP5000001.0083.0 2SP500,Merton,  

Rtt
r
t
EV  ,                           (2) 
 487.0,206.0013.0 2(Hist),,30Merton,  

Rt
Hist
t
rμ
t
EV  ,                           (3) 
497.0,VIX223.0024.0 2(VIX),1Merton,  

Rtt
r
t
EV   ,                                 (4) 
568.0,VIX096.0116.0SP5000001.0012.0 2all,1,30Merton,  

Rtt-
Hist
tt
r
t
EV  .            (5) 
By construction, residuals of the above regressions are orthogonal to the variable(s) in the 
right-hand side of each equation, thus allowing us to assess the net information content of 
EV r

Merton  as a proxy of market default risk. By adopting this regression approach, we limit the 
possibility to observe any spurious relations between the orthogonalized EV
r


Merton  measures 
and options-related variables that could otherwise have emerged with the raw EV
r


Merton  
measure. Despite the above orthogonalization, untabulated statistics reveal that regression 
residuals resulting from Eqs. (2)-(5) are still strongly correlated with EV
r


Merton  (with Pearson’s 
correlations to exceed 0.67 and Spearman correlations to exceed 0.53). This indicates that 
MDLI as proxied by EV
r


Merton  captures additional information, which is over and above of 
that captured by other major economic variables such the ones included in Eqs. (2)-(5).    
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 Table 5 reports day-groups of certain variables by allocating the orthogonalized 
EV r

Merton  values (namely, 
SP500
,t  in Panel A,  
(hist)
,
 t  in Panel B, 
VIX
,t  in Panel C and 
all
,t  in 
Panel D) in three asymmetric groups: The LOW group includes all orthogonalized EV
r


Merton  
values which are less than the 50th percentile of the whole period, the MEDIUM group 
includes values between the 50th and 80th percentiles, while the HIGH group includes values 
greater than the 80th percentile.
8
 Regarding the behavior of the three orthogonalized EV
r


Merton  
groups, it is intriguing enough to observe from Table 5 that there are statistically significant 
differences between the LOW and HIGH groups. For instance, from Panel A the mean value 
of the LOW group for 
SP500
,t  is -1.6%, while that for the HIGH group is equal to 3.2%  
with the difference equal to 4.8% also statistically significant at the 1% level (all t-statistics 
for this table are computed using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors). 
Similar patterns are observed for the rest market default risk residuals exhibited in Panels B 
to D.   
Table 5 also reports the corresponding LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH day-group mean 
values for the: i) 30-day-ahead realized volatility (
Ahead
30 ), ii) implied volatility of at-the-
money calls belonging in delta moneyness category 3 (
Calls
3 ), iii) implied volatility of at-
the-money puts belonging in delta moneyness category 3 (
Puts
3 ), and iv) 60- and 91-day 
risk-neutral volatilities, skewness, and kurtosis. Results show that there is a smooth 
monotonic pattern between the LOW and HIGH groups for all options-related variables. For 
instance, as expected, the higher the level of the orthogonalized EV
r


Merton , the higher the 
values for 
Ahead
30 , 
Calls
3 , and 
Puts
3 . In addition, there is a strong positive (negative) 
                                                 
8
 Similar results prevail when the 70th percentile is used as the breaking point between the MEDIUM 
and HIGH portfolios. We choose to break down the groups in such an asymmetric manner because 
financial distress is, by definition, a tail event measure. In the same vein, Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
use asymmetric day-groups to investigate the out-of-sample default risk accuracy in the bankruptcy 
context, while Campbell et al. (2008) investigate the relation between risk and the mean returns of 
distressed stocks using asymmetric groups that pay greater attention to the tails of the default risk 
distribution.    
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relation between the orthogonalized EV
r


Merton and risk-neutral skewness (kurtosis). Overall, 
using evidence in Table 5, we can attest that EV
rMerton  has a significant role to play on how 
option-related variables are determined, especially on how investors’ trading behavior 
determines the daily shape of the S&P 500 Index risk-neutral distributions.
9
 
[Table 5, here] 
 
4.4 Determinants of the S&P 500 Index Option-Implied Risk-Neutral Distributions 
We rely on regression analysis to investigate the relation between the S&P 500 Index 
option-implied risk-neutral distributions, the MDLI as proxied by EV
r


Merton , and a set of other 
economic variables. The analysis includes variables that are relevant to the characteristics of 
the underlying asset, variables that may predict the future stock market state/conditions and 
variables that capture characteristics of the option market.  
Based on prior empirical evidence, the following economic determinants are 
considered. In the spirit of Peña et al. (1999), a dummy variable for Mondays, tMON , is 
used to check whether risk-neutral moments differ significantly at the beginning of the week 
(see also, Bakshi et al. (2003)). As in Han (2008), the one-day lagged value of the CBOE 
VIX index, 1VIX t , is used as a proxy for the uncertainty in the underlying market. 
Furthermore, the one-day-lagged log of the S&P 500 dollar trading volume, 1IdxVol t , is 
used as a measure for the level of activity due to the information flow in the underlying 
market. 
We use two variables that can potentially predict the future state of the underlying 
market. One variable is the log of the S&P 500 Index short-run momentum, tIdxMom , given 
as the ratio of its 60-day moving average divided by its current level: 
                                                 
9
 Qualitatively similar results are obtained when using the raw measure of EV rMerton  instead of the 
residuals from Eqs. (2)-(5). Similar results also emerge when using either GV r

Merton
 or FV r

Merton
 instead 
of EV rMerton  (either in raw levels or in residuals taken from Eqs. (2)-(5)). All these results are available 
upon request. 
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t
t
tj
j
t
SP500
SP50060/1
logIdxMom
60-
1


 ,                             (6) 
where tSP500  is the value of the index at the end of trading day t. The other variable is a 
measure of the log relative T-bill rate level with respect to its 60-day moving average, 
tTbMom , defined as 
 



60-
1
3m
3m
60/1
logTbMom
t
tj
j
t
t
r
r
,                                        (7) 
where 
3m
tr  is the three-month Treasury constant maturity rate at the end of trading day t. 
Chen (1991) indicates the importance of such macroeconomic variables in predicting the 
future economic activity of the market (see also, Chan et al. (1998); Han (2008)). 
We also include three variables that can potentially capture the characteristics of the 
option market. The first variable refers to the daily mean percentage bid–ask spread, 
tA-B , 
for all options transacted during the day (we define 
tA-B  to become more negative as the 
bid–ask spread widens). Such a variable can be a proxy measure of trading activity and of 
transaction costs faced by agents participating in the option market (George and Longstaff 
(1993)). The second variable is the one-day-lagged log of the number of call and put option 
contracts traded throughout the day, 
1OptVol t . This variable is used as a measure of 
investors’ heterogeneity of beliefs that triggers trading activity in the option market (Buraschi 
and Jiltsov (2006), Wong et al., 2011). The third measure represents the net buying pressure 
variable, 
tNBP , following Bollen and Whaley (2004). tNBP  is defined to be the ratio of the 
open interest of out-of-the-money puts (options in the delta range (-0.375,-0.125)) to the open 
interest of near and at-the-money options (call options in the delta range (0.375,0.625) and put 
options in the delta range (-0.375,-0.125)). This variable captures the net buying pressure for 
out-of-the-money puts which mainly reflects institutional investors’ trading activity upon their 
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hedging needs. Such a directional buying pressure may affect the shape of the risk-neutral 
distribution due to the presence of limits to arbitrage (Bollen and Whaley (2004)). 
Additionally, we consider the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index, 
tBWsent , as previous literature suggests that market sentiment can have a significant effect 
on index options risk-neutral skewness through its impact on the pricing kernel. In particular, 
Han (2008) finds that changes in investor sentiment help explain time variation in the slope of 
index option smile and that the impact of investor sentiment on risk-neutral skewness is 
higher in the presence of high limits to arbitrage.
10
  
The contemporaneous S&P 500 Index return, tRET , is the next variable we include 
in the analysis. Bollen and Whaley (2004) suggest that including tRET  in such a regression 
analysis helps control for the leverage effect. This is true, since as reported in Table 2 the 
correlation of tRET  with 
EV r
t



,Merton  is -0.594.  
 Table 6 reports correlation coefficients between the 60-day risk-neutral moments and 
rest economic determinants which subsequently are being used as independent variables in 
the time series regression analysis. To conserve space and bring into focus the key results we 
report correlation coefficients for the full period 1998-2007. Untabulated results reveal 
similar correlation coefficients for the two periods 1998-2002 and 2003-2007. Correlations of 
variables displayed in Table 6 with the 91-day risk-neutral moments are again similar in 
magnitudes with the ones reported for the 60-day ones. The correlations reported are 
consistent with the inferences drawn from Table 5 on the relation of EV
rMerton  with risk-neutral 
moments. The level of the MDLI is strongly positively (negatively) correlated with risk-
neutral volatility and skewness (kurtosis). In particular, the Pearson’s (Spearman’s) 
correlation of EV
rMerton  with 60MFIV  is 0.701 (0.711), with 60SKEW  is 0.704 (0.785) and 
                                                 
10
 Since the Baker and Wurgler sentiment index data come to an annual or monthly frequency, we 
choose the monthly data and convert them to daily by matching each day of a month with the 
respective monthly value. We use sentiment changes in the regression analysis because the original 
variable in levels appears to be nonstationary during our period. 
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with 60KURT  is -0.687 (-0.810). In addition, correlations also reveal interesting relations 
between the rest economic determinants and the risk-neutral moments (discussed in more 
detail in the multivariate time series regression analysis that follows). Finally, in the bottom 
of Table 6 we report the variance inflation factor (VIF) to investigate the existence of co-
linearity between the economic determinants that are being used as independent variables in 
the regression analysis. As can been seen from the reported figures, all VIF values are well 
below the generally accepted cut-off value of 10, therefore it is less likely that our model 
specifications suffer from the co-linearity problem.
11
     
[Table 6, here] 
 To investigate the relation under a multivariate regression analysis, we estimate the 
following time series model: 
,*RET  RET
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 (8) 
where the dependent variable ty  is one of the six risk-neutral moments, 
],,,,,[ 919191606060 KURTSKEWMFIVKURTSKEWMFIVy . An augmented Dickey–
Fuller (ADF) test rejects the non-stationarity for all of the S&P 500 risk-neutral moments (a 
Phillips–Perron test provides similar results). In the regression model we include two lag 
values of the risk-neutral moments as an effective way to tackle positive serial correlation that 
can potentially aggravate the standard errors of the t-statistics and possible omitted variable 
misspecification issues. This also allows us to assess how much weight traders put on lagged 
moments in determining the current value providing information for the persistency of the 
risk-neutral distributions (Peña et al. (1999); Dennis and Meyhew (2002); Han (2008); Taylor 
et al. (2009)). An ADF test reveals that TbMom has a unit root, so the first differences of 
this variable, TbMom , are used in the regression analysis. Moreover, instead of the index 
                                                 
11
 To guard against erroneous inferences on the co-linearity problem, all our regression analysis is 
repeated by excluding independent variables which exhibit high correlations to reach similar 
conclusions as the ones presented in Table 8 which includes the full set of economics determinants 
employed in this study. 
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return, tRET , we use tRET , which is taken to be the residual from the regression 
(estimated separately for each period): 
t
r
tt
EVbb RET*RET ,Merton10 
   .                                   (9) 
This decomposition helps to remove the leverage effect from the contemporaneous 
index return which is predominantly captured by the MDLI measure. Finally, we include 
three variables that relate to market default risk. An ADF test shows that EV
r


Merton  has a unit 
root (a Phillips–Perron test provides similar results); hence we use EV
r


Merton  in the regression 
analysis. We also use the absolute value of EV
r


Merton  to gauge its asymmetric effect on the 
shape of the implied volatility curves. Finally, we also use an interaction term of EV
r


Merton
with tRET . 
Table 7 reports a reduced version of the regression model in Eq. (8) where we include 
the two lag values of risk-neutral moments along with EV
r


Merton  to investigate our main 
hypothesis of whether market default risk is affecting the daily risk-neutral distributions of 
the S&P 500 Index options. First, we note that the explanatory power of the regression 
models is significantly high, with an overall average value of R
2 
above 88%. Thus, the 
regression analysis is an adequate tool for explaining the time variation of risk-neutral 
moments. Second, as shown from the reported coefficients and the associated t-statistics, 
 ,Merton
EV r
t



appears to be a key determinant of the daily option-implied risk-neutral 
distributions. Specifically,  ,Merton
EV r
t



 is found to be strongly positively related to risk-
neutral volatility in both periods, with the relations to be statically significant at 1% or better. 
Likewise, consistent with the results reported in the correlation analysis in Table 6, the MDLI 
measure is also strongly positively (negatively) related to risk-neutral skewness (kurtosis). 
Finally, findings show that the current shape of the implied volatility curve is significantly 
affected by its shape during the previous two days (see also, Han, 2008). The previous day’s 
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risk-neutral coefficient seems to be more important though, since it carries a larger loading 
compared with the two-days lagged one (and it is always significant at 1% or better). 
[Table 7, here] 
Table 8 tabulates the results after we estimate the full version of the regression model 
in Eq. (8). This analysis allows us to investigate whether the relations of MDLI with the risk-
neutral distributions remain significant after including additional economic variables in the 
regression analysis. We can make several important observations out of Table 8, some of 
which concern novel empirical evidence that sheds light on what drives the daily risk-neutral 
distributions of the S&P 500 Index options.
12
 
[Table 8, here] 
The Monday effect, tMON , appears to be a determinant of the risk-neutral asset 
return moments, with negative (positive) and statistically significant coefficients for risk-
neutral volatility (skewness), especially in the second period. This evidence suggests a 
tendency for higher levels of volatility and more negative risk-neutral skewness on Fridays, 
most probably in anticipation of bad news that can hit the market during the weekend. 
The variables tIdxMom  and 1VIX t , which capture the relevant characteristics of 
the underlying market, play a very important role, since both are related to the risk-neutral 
moments (especially during the first period where the market is trending downward). In 
particular, index risk-neutral volatility (skewness) becomes higher (less negative) when VIX 
is higher. Bollen and Whaley (2004) conjecture that the movement and shape of the S&P 500 
Index implied volatility curves depend highly upon whether the net public demand for 
options is to buy or to sell. From the results here, it is highly likely that investors use 
tIdxMom  and 1VIX t  to form expectations for the future states of the underlying asset, and, 
eventually, these variables affect the net public demand for options. 
As in Peña et al. (1999), we find that the measure of the log relative T-bill rate, 
tTbMom , is an economic determinant of the index options, especially with respect to risk-
                                                 
12
 Results when estimating the regression models for the full period 1998-2007 remain the same. 
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neutral skewness. In particular, a lower log relative T-bill rate is associated with less negative 
skewness. This evidence coincides with that of Chen (1991), who reports that lower T-bill 
rates reflect lower expected inflation, which in turn reflects higher future economic growth. 
Inasmuch, the mean percentage bid–ask spread ( tA-B ) also affects to some extent risk-
neutral skewness and kurtosis in the first period; in particular, when the mean bid–ask spread 
becomes more negative as a result of a wider spread, risk-neutral skewness (kurtosis) 
becomes more negative (positive).
13
 In the same vein, Peña et al. (1999) report that the degree 
of curvature of the Spanish option market implied volatility curves is positively related to the 
bid–ask spread. 
The Baker and Wurgler sentiment, tBWsent , does not appear to have a significant 
effect on the risk-neutral moments of the S&P 500 Index. This result is in stark contrast with 
Han (2008) who finds a significant positive relationship for the period from January 1988 to 
June 1997. The absence of relation between the investor sentiment and the risk-neutral 
moments for the more recent data periods (especially with respect to the risk-neutral 
skewness) is probably due to the fact that limits to arbitrage in the S&P 500 Index options 
market may have decreased over time, thus eliminating any significant relationship between 
sentiment and risk-neutral moments which has previously been reported by Han (2008).  
The net buying pressure measure, tNBP , is found to have a strong impact on the 
daily shapes of the S&P 500 option-implied risk-neutral distributions across both periods. 
Consistent with the notion that a high demand for out-of-the-money puts implies that a large 
number of investors anticipate a downturn in the market, tNBP  is negatively (positively) 
                                                 
13
 We acknowledge that tA-B  carries the opposite signs with respect to the risk-neutral moments in 
the second period, which is contrary to what we expect to observe (although we do not observe any 
statistical significance on the regression coefficients). We checked whether this is due to co-linearity, 
but the highest correlation of tA-B  with the rest of the regressors is less than 11% (in absolute terms) 
based on the sub-sample correlations. Since the two periods differ in terms of market conditions, one 
possibility is that the effect of tA-B  is conditional on the direction of the market. 
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related to the risk-neutral skewness (risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis).
14
 Bollen and Whaley 
(2004) find that changes in the level of an option’s implied volatility are positively related to 
time variation in demand for the option. In the same vein, Han (2008) finds a significantly 
negative impact on S&P 500 Index risk-neutral skewness. 
Regarding the role of MDLI, even after including a large set of economic variables 
 ,Merton
EV r
t



 continues to affect in a statistically significant fashion the daily risk-neutral 
distributions. In the same line of reasoning with the leverage effect hypothesis (Figlewski and 
Wang, 2000),  ,Merton
EV r
t



 is found to be positively related to risk-neutral volatility ( 60MFIV  
and 91MFIV ) in both periods. In addition, as in Figlewski and Wang (2000), this relation 
appears to be asymmetric, since the coefficient of  ,Merton
EV r
t



is always positive. 
Under the traditional option pricing models, such as the Black–Scholes, there should 
be no relation between the rest of the risk-neutral moments and the MDLI measure. However, 
the findings in Table 8 challenge this view, since, in almost all cases considered,  ,Merton
EV r
t



 
is positively (negatively) related to risk-neutral skewness (kurtosis). Findings suggests that on 
high-MDLI days, the market assigns higher levels of risk-neutral skewness (i.e., higher 
probability of large positive returns) and lower levels of risk-neutral kurtosis (i.e., lighter 
tails). This is a key result and coincides with firm level findings documented by prior 
research. In particularly, Dennis and Mayhew (2002) document that firms with more leverage 
tend to have less negative skews. Taylor et al. (2009) report that leverage is positively and 
strongly related to risk-neutral skewness implied by the prices of individual stock options. All 
in all, our results lend further credence to the notion that relations that have been observed at 
the firm level extend likewise to the economy level. 
In the context of asset pricing studies, prior empirical literature has established a 
negative relation between market default spreads and future economic growth (Chen, 1991; 
                                                 
14
 We obtain similar results if we alternatively define the NBP variable to be the open interest ratio of 
out-of-the-money puts to calls (puts in the delta range (-0.375,-0.125) and calls in the delta range 
(0.125,0.375)). 
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Chan et al., 1998). Moreover, under the rational representative agent framework, someone 
should predict that days with high MDLI values should associate with more negative risk-
neutral skewness. Nevertheless, within an option pricing context, our results reveal a positive 
(negative) relation between the MDLI and risk-neutral skewness (kurtosis). The observed 
relations may be the result of behavioral bias (i.e., the gambler’s fallacy) spurred from option 
market participants. In the same vein, Han (2008) finds that changes in investor sentiment 
help explain the time variation in the risk-neutral skewness of the S&P 500 Index options, an 
empirical fact that is at odds with rational perfect–market–based option pricing models.  
Finally, tRET is also found to be a primary economic determinant of risk-neutral 
distributions. Results in Table 8 show that tRET , which is free of the leverage effect, still 
has a negative sign in relation to the level of the options’ implied volatility as captured by 
60MFIV  and 90MFIV . In addition, we observe a strong negative (positive) relation of tRET  
to the options’ risk-neutral skewness (kurtosis). This observation brings a new perspective to 
the role of returns. In particular, it reveals a tacit aspect of the contemporaneous market 
returns, which most probably relates to the perception of the market agents regarding the 
short-term risk (i.e., random jumps) that underlies the S&P 500 Index. 
The following treatments are carried out for robustness purposes.
15
 First, our 
empirical inferences are qualitatively the same if the naïve estimator of Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) is employed in place of EV
r


Merton .
16
 Second, since the S&P 500 is a value-
weighted equity index, we reconstruct each of the three MDLI computed by Eq. (1) using a 
value-weighted scheme, where each firm-specific default risk computed for the firm i on day 
t (i.e., ),(Merton ti
qV   with },,{ GFE rrrq ) is weighted by the market-capitalization of each 
firm (market-capitalization is computed by taking the number of outstanding shares of each 
                                                 
15
 All robustness analysis results are available upon request. 
16
 Like in Bharath and Shumway (2008), we find that the distribution of EV
rMerton  is extremely similar 
to the one of naïve alternative 
EV r

naive  and that both default risk measures deliver similar estimates of 
asset volatility. Moreover, Bharath and Shumway (2008) report a correlation value of about 0.98 
between their EV
rMerton  and 
EV r

naive , whereas this figure is about to 0.99 in our sample. 
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firm and multiplying that number by the firm's daily share price, whereas the daily market 
weight is calculated by dividing the market capitalization of a firm on the index by the total 
market capitalization of all non-financial firms that are included in the S&P 500 portfolio). 
We re-estimate all regression model specifications as in Table 8 using the value-weighted 
version of EV
r


Merton  to reach qualitatively similar results. We also reach similar results if, 
instead, we re-estimate these regression models using the value-weighted versions of either 
FV rMerton  or 
GV rMerton . Third, the results remain unchanged if the 30-day constant maturity risk-
neutral moments are used instead. Fourth, Amin et al. (2004) document that option prices are 
affected by past stock returns. Although we have already controlled for market momentum 
via tIdxMom , all regression models of Table 8 are re-estimated by including one-, two-, and 
three-lag values of the daily index return, with no significant changes. Fifth, the same results 
are obtained when using a 30- or 60-day historical average volatility instead of VIX. Sixth, to 
preclude the possibility that the contemporaneous value of EV
rMerton  appears to be a strong 
economic determinant because it shares information with the S&P 500 Index options, we re-
run all regression models using the one-day-lagged value of MDLI, EV
r
t



1,Merton . Again, the 
results are similar to those reported in Table 8. Finally, instead of using the model-free risk-
neutral moments based on the methodology of Bakshi et al. (2003), we investigate whether 
the above relations are robust using the coefficients obtained from a regression-based 
structural volatility model similar to those used by Dumas et al. (1998).
17
 Again, the results 
are similar, since we find that the MDLI is positively (negatively) related to the level and 
slope (convexity) of the implied volatility curve (qualitatively similar results also hold for the 
rest of the economic determinants). 
                                                 
17
 We model index-implied volatilities by fitting the Black–Scholes (1973) option pricing model to 
observed option prices each day t, whereas the implied volatility curve is modeled as follows: 
)])/(ln[]/ln[,01.0max( 2210 KSaKSaa   
Following Andreou et al. (2014), the volatility function is estimated via nonlinear least squares by 
using the daily joint set of out-of-the-money calls and out-of-the-money puts. In the estimation we 
include options with maturities of less than 60 days. Zhang and Xiang (2008) derive analytical 
formulas that relate the level ( 0a ), slope ( 1a ), and convexity ( 2a ) of the volatility function to the 
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, respectively, of the asset return risk-neutral distribution.  
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5. Conclusions 
This study provides novel empirical evidence regarding the impact of market default 
risk on the daily evolution of the S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral distributions. 
The analysis shows that market default risk has a dual role to play, since it can capture both 
the market leverage effect as well as the market’s perceptions about future economic 
prospects. The analysis also reveals that index option risk-neutral distributions are 
simultaneously affected by other economic determinants that are relevant to the 
characteristics of the underlying asset (i.e., market uncertainty and market direction), 
characteristics of the option market (i.e., seasonality, option activity, and transaction costs), as 
well as the recent behavior (persistence) of the implied volatility curves.  
Previous empirical evidence has shown that certain modern parametric option pricing 
models have limited forecasting capabilities and exhibit fairly poor hedging performance 
(e.g., Bakshi et al. (1997); Dumas et al. (1998); Pan (2002); Andreou et al. (2014)). Our 
results can explain why theoretical predictions of such option pricing models are not 
consistent with what is observed in practice regarding the S&P 500 Index implied volatility 
curves. In that respect, the findings of this study have accentuated the importance of specific 
economic determinants that market participants can utilize to achieve more precise option 
pricing and improve risk management practices. 
It is also noteworthy that, since the flurry of the financial crisis, financial press has 
stressed the importance of studying unconventional risk indicators that may help investors to 
better apprehend the forces that drive financial markets and allow them to follow more 
prudent investment practices when such (disaster) indicators suggest another crisis might 
happen (Shimko (2009)). In that vein, since the market default risk index is found to affect 
the higher-order risk-neutral moments of index options, future research should consider it a 
strong candidate for forecasting (jump or disaster) risk. 
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Appendices 
A. Merton DD Model and the Probability-to-Default 
 The Merton distance-to-default (DD) model estimates the market value of the debt by 
utilizing the Merton (1974) bond pricing model. This model posits that the dynamics of a 
firm’s equity value can be described by a geometric Brownian motion 
EdWσEdtdE EE   , (A.1) 
where E  is the value of the firm’s equity, E  is the continuously compounded expected 
return on E  (i.e., the instantaneous drift), E  is the instantaneous volatility of the firm’s 
equity values, and dW  is a standard Gauss–Wiener process. Merton (1974) shows that the 
dynamics of the total value of a firm can also be described by a geometric Brownian motion: 
VdWσVdtdV VV   , (A.2) 
where V  is the total value of the firm’s assets, V  is the continuously compounded expected 
return on V , and V  is the instantaneous volatility of firm value. 
 Under the classic Merton (1974) model, the market value of equity, E , is viewed as 
a call option on the total value of the assets, V  (i.e., the underlying asset), with exercise price 
equal to the face value of the debt, F , and time to maturity T . Therefore, the market value of 
equity can be described by the Black–Scholes (1973) formula for call options: 
 )()( TdFedVE V
rT   ,                              (A.3) 
where 
T
TrFV
d
V
VF

 )5.0()/(ln 2
 ,                                     (A.4) 
with Fr  to be the instantaneous risk-free rate and (.)  to be the cumulative standard normal 
distribution. Since the volatility of the firm’s total assets is not readily available from the 
market, the model explores the fact that ),( TVfE   and uses Itô’s lemma to derive that the 
volatility of the equity returns is 
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VE d
E
V
 )(





 , (A.5) 
with )(/ dVE   to denote the delta hedge parameter computed by Eq. (A.3), where d  is 
given by Eq. (A.4). Equation (A.5) reflects the fact that the volatility of an option (i.e., the 
equity in this case) is always greater than or equal to the volatility of the underlying asset 
(i.e., the market value of total assets). Moreover, it can offer an explanation for the stylized 
negative correlation between the index price and its volatility; that is, when the equity index 
level drops, the equity index volatility rises, and vice versa (coined as the leverage effect). 
 From an implementation perspective, E , E , and Fr  can be observed from the 
financial markets, while F  and T  can be observed from the financial statements of the firm. 
On the contrary, V  and V  should be inferred numerically using the Merton DD model, 
since neither is directly observable. Once numerical values are obtained for V  and V , the 
DD value at time instance t is: 
T
TFV
DD
V
VV
t

 )5.0()/ln( 2
 . (A.6) 
The resulting probability-to-default value is computed using the normal cumulative 
distribution: 
)(Merton tDD . (A.7) 
Eq. (A.7) demonstrates that the probability a firm will default by time T is the probability that 
shareholders will not exercise their call option to buy the assets of the company for F at time 
T. The ratio FV / can be conceived as measure of market-value of assets to book-value of 
debt, which in essence is an inverse measure of leverage (a more appropriate definition of 
leverage would be: 
V
Fe
TrF
) . Under the mild condition that the volatility of the asset value     
( V ) and the expected return on the firm’s total assets ( V ) remain constant, then the 
probability-to-default depends only on the inverse leverage value; in this respect, the relation 
behind Eq. (A.7) implies that higher leverage would result into higher probability-to-default 
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values. In this respect, the Merton model implies a deterministic relation between the 
distance-to-default as captured by DD in Eq. (A.6) and the probability-to-default as computed 
in Eq. (A.7).  
 Figure A.1 shown below illustrates the theoretical relation between leverage and 
Merton firm-specific probability-to-default as defined in Eq. (A.7); for purpose of illustration, 
Debt-to-Equity ranges from 20% to 100%, expected return on the firm’s total assets is set to 
5%, volatility of total assets is set to three different values (30%, 40% and 50%) and time 
forecasting horizon is set to one year. As expected, default risk is an increasing function of 
leverage as captured by the Debt-to-Equity ratio. In addition, empirical support of the 
abovementioned relation is illustrated in Figure 2 which depicts that market default risk as 
captured by our MDLI measure moves in tandem with market leverage as captured by the 
market Debt-to-Equity ratio.  
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Figure A.1: Relation between Debt-to-Equity and Merton probability-to-default   
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B. Expected Returns on the Firm’s Assets Using Hedge Parameters 
Given the fact that ),( TVfE  , we can use Ito’s Lemma to derive another expression for the 
dynamics of the equity: 
dW
V
E
Vdt
t
E
V
E
V
V
E
VdE VVV



















 
2
2
225.0 . (B.1) 
By comparing the drift terms of Eqs. (A.1) and (B.1), we have that 
t
E
V
E
V
V
E
VE VVE








 
2
2
225.0 ,         
and by rearranging terms,  
 
V
E
V
t
E
V
E
VEr VEVG

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




 /)5.0(
2
2
22 , (B.2)  
where the hedge parameters are given as follows: 
 )(:delta d
V
E



, (B.3)        
TV
dN
V
E
V
)('
:gamma
2
2



, (B.4)        
)(
2
)('
:theta TdrFe
T
dV
t
E
V
rTV 





 
, (B.5)        
with )(' d  to denote the density function for the standard normal distribution. 
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C. Risk-Neutral Moments: The Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan (2003) Method 
 Following closely Bakshi et al. (2003), for a given trading day t, let 
)]([ln)]([ln),( tStStR    to be the τ-period log-price relative asset return. Let 
}),({),( 2*   tReEtV rt
 , }),({),( 3*   tReEtW rt
 , and }),({),( 4*   tReEtX rt
  to 
denote the fair value of the payoffs of the variance contract, the cubic contract and the quartic 
contracts respectively. The price for the variance contract is given by: 
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The price for the cubic contract is given by: 
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The price for the quartic contracts is given by: 
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Finally, the risk-neutral moments over the period [t, t+τ] are calculated as follows. The τ-
period risk-neutral volatility, ),( tMFIV , is given by:    
222* ),(),(),(}),({),(  tetVttREtMFIV rTt  .                               (C.4) 
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The τ-period risk-neutral skewness, ),( tSKEW , is given by:   
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The τ-period risk-neutral kurtosis, ),( tKURT , is given by:   
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where 
*
tE  denotes the expected value operator under the risk-neutral measure, and  
)},({),( *  tREt t  denotes the τ-period mean of the log-relative asset return given as: 
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r  . Moreover, );,( KtC   and );,( KtP   
denote the prices of European call and put options respectively, traded on day t, with maturity 
τ and strike price K . Please refer to the original paper for further details (Bakshi et al., 
(2003), p. 106-107).   
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Figures 
Figure 1: Daily evolution of the S&P 500 Debt-to-Equity against the S&P 500 Index level  
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Figure 2: Daily evolution of the S&P 500 Debt-to-Equity against the MDLI measure  
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Figure 3: Daily evolution of the alternative MDLI measures against the S&P 500 index level 
 
 
 
This figure plots the daily evolution of the three alternative MDLI measures against the S&P 500 Index level from January 1998 to December 2007. The top panel depicts the 
MDLI when the expected return of the firm’s assets is equal to the firm’s stock return over the previous year ( Er ). The middle panel depicts the MDLI when the expected 
return of the firm’s assets is equal to the alternative return estimate described in Appendix B ( Gr ). The bottom panel depicts the MDLI when the expected return of the firm’s 
assets is equal to the prevailing risk-free rate ( Fr ). 
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Tables  
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics: Means, standard deviations and percentiles 
 
    Percentiles  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.99 Max 
 Panel A: Merton DD model variables (computed across firm observations) 
E  20,126.9 35,442.0 838.6 4,042.5 8,311.9 17,972.5 84,619.3 224,918.8 228,722.3 
F  2,272.3 3,379.3 1.1 324.1 949.8 2,873.6 8,730.2 18,580.9 21,684.9 
TANI /  0.015 0.027 -0.441 0.006 0.015 0.025 0.048 0.074 0.407 
Fr  0.038 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.042 0.051 0.062 0.063 0.064 
Er  -0.027 0.391 -1.416 -0.216 0.026 0.214 0.519 0.862 0.862 
Gr  -0.011 0.332 -1.202 -0.171 0.027 0.188 0.464 0.760 0.799 
E  0.410 0.225 0.135 0.250 0.344 0.490 0.869 1.188 1.189 
V  0.355 0.218 0.052 0.207 0.289 0.419 0.815 1.108 1.189 
 
         
 Panel B: Market default-risk measures (computed by aggregating all daily firm observations) 
EV r

Merton  0.022 0.022 0.000 0.004 0.013 0.033 0.070 0.087 0.102 
FV r

Merton  0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.014 0.014 
GV r

Merton  0.011 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.041 0.049 0.055 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in the Merton DD model estimation (Panel A) and for the 
estimated market default-risk measures (Panel B). The sample spans from January 1998 to December 2007. 
Variables presented in Panel A have been winsorized at 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. E  is the market value of equity 
measured in millions of dollars computed by multiplying the firm’s shares outstanding by its stock price at the end 
of each day. F  is the face value of debt in millions of dollars and equals debt in current liabilities plus one-half of 
the long-term debt. TANI /  is net income over the book value of total assets, Fr  is the risk-free rate measured as 
the 1-year treasury constant maturity rate, Er  is the expected return on the firm’s assets and is equal to the firm’s 
stock returns over the previous year, Gr  is an alternative estimate of the expected return on the firm’s assets 
(given in Appendix B), E  is the equity’s volatility measured to be the annualized standard deviation of daily 
returns using prior’s year stock data and V  is the volatility of the market value of the firm’s assets that is derived 
when estimating the Merton DD model. Variables presented in Panel B are the three different market default 
likelihood index (MDLI) measures derived after aggregating daily the probability-to-default values of individual 
firms. 
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Table 2 
Correlation coefficients for daily levels and changes  
 
Panel A: Correlation coefficients between daily S&P 500 Index levels and levels of 
market default likelihood index measures 
 SP500 EV
r


Merton  
FV rMerton  
GV r

Merton   
SP500  -0.252 -0.406 -0.299  
EV r

Merton  -0.409  0.763 0.954 
 
FV rMerton  -0.618 0.827  0.844 
 
GV r

Merton  -0.491 0.977 0.893   
 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients between daily S&P 500 Index returns and changes in 
values of market default likelihood index measures 
 RET EV
rMerton  
FV r

Merton  
GV rMerton   
RET  -0.550 -0.541 -0.545  
EV rMerton  -0.594  0.578 0.910 
 
FV r

Merton  -0.313 0.562  0.667 
 
GV rMerton  -0.571 0.937 0.703  
 
This table reports the Pearson’s correlations (lower diagonal) and Spearman’s rank correlations (upper 
diagonal) between the market default likelihood index (MDLI) measures, the S&P 500 Index level, 
SP500, and the S&P 500 Index return, RET. Panel A reports correlation coefficients for the levels of 
the MDLI measures. Panel B reports correlation coefficients for the corresponding first differences 
(i.e., daily changes) of the MDLI measures. All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 1% significance level. 
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Table 3 
Option sample characteristics  
Delta value category 1 2 3 4 5 Totals 
 Panel A: Call Options 
Moneyness DITM ITM ATM OTM DOTM ALL 
Call Delta (
c ) ]000.1
,875.0(  
]875.0
,625.0(  
]625.0
,375.0(  
]375.0
,125.0(  
]125.0
,000.0(  
]000.1
,000.0(  
Number of obs. 18,874 28,604 50,925 55,657 18,677 172,737 
Option value 108.857 72.621 44.146 13.734 3.268 41.713 
% Bid-Ask spread 2.324 3.782 5.833 13.402 25.604 9.686 
Implied volatility 0.234 0.213 0.202 0.177 0.164 0.195 
Option volume 230 502 1,500 1,173 930 1,029 
Volume proportion 0.009 0.031 0.164 0.140 0.037 0.382 
       
 Panel B: Put Options 
Moneyness DOTM OTM ATM ITM DITM ALL 
Put Delta (
p ) ]000.0
,125.0(  
]125.0
,375.0(

  
]375.0
,625.0(

  
]625.0
,875.0(

  
]875.0
,000.1(

  
]000.0
,000.1(  
Number of obs. 60,501 58,152 50,628 24,947 6,112 200,340 
Option value 7.364 25.526 47.864 71.695 103.814 33.824 
% Bid-Ask spread 17.613 8.591 5.410 4.058 2.721 9.768 
Implied volatility 0.233 0.221 0.199 0.186 0.234 0.215 
Option volume 1,612 1,554 1,681 506 231 1,433 
Volume proportion 0.210 0.194 0.183 0.027 0.003 0.618 
       
This table reports sample characteristics of the option dataset for the period spanning from January 
1998 to December 2007. The figures presented are for different moneyness classes created using calls’, 
c , and puts’, p  option delta values. The proxy for the volatility rate used in the delta calculations is 
the realized return volatility of the S&P 500 Index over the most recent sixty trading days. Panel A 
displays information for call options. Panel B displays information for put options. The first line of 
figures of each panel refers to the moneyness class number of option observations, the second line 
refers to the moneyness class average option market prices (mid-point of the bid-ask prices), the third 
line refers to the moneyness class average percentage bid-ask spread value, the fourth line refers to the 
moneyness class average implied volatility computed via the Black–Scholes (1973) model, the fifth 
line refers to the moneyness class average option volume, while the last line reports the moneyness 
class proportion of the total (calls and puts) option trading volume. Moneyness classes are as follows. 
DOTM = deep-out-the-money options; OTM = out-the-money options; ATM = at-the-money options; 
ITM = in-the-money options; and DITM = Deep-in-the-money options. 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics of the S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral moments 
 
30MFIV  30SKEW  30KURT  60MFIV  60SKEW  60KURT  91MFIV  91SKEW  91KURT  
 Panel A: Full period (1998-2007) 
Min 0.092 -2.466 3.238 0.104 -2.493 3.101 0.111 -2.341 2.881 
Mean 0.199 -1.259 5.668 0.206 -1.298 5.469 0.207 -1.190 4.816 
t-stat 54.200 -78.629 94.818 66.846 -87.296 85.292 70.655 -82.100 82.960 
Median 0.198 -1.243 5.472 0.206 -1.282 5.141 0.208 -1.147 4.404 
Max 0.460 -0.407 11.928 0.434 -0.598 11.546 0.431 -0.424 9.618 
          
 Panel B: First period (1998-2002) 
Min 0.157 -2.064 3.238 0.167 -1.701 3.101 0.170 -1.524 2.881 
Mean 0.244 -1.230 5.463 0.246 -1.127 4.643 0.245 -0.995 4.020 
t-stat 62.420 -62.360 79.980 79.854 -89.214 118.762 84.656 -99.590 159.007 
Median 0.230 -1.225 5.338 0.235 -1.125 4.616 0.236 -0.990 3.994 
Max 0.460 -0.407 9.440 0.434 -0.598 6.713 0.431 -0.424 5.502 
          
 Panel C: Second period (2003-2007) 
Min 0.092 -2.466 3.621 0.104 -2.493 3.340 0.111 -2.341 2.951 
Mean 0.154 -1.289 5.878 0.163 -1.477 6.326 0.166 -1.395 5.651 
t-stat 39.726 -51.298 61.272 48.072 -70.698 69.676 51.853 -73.713 69.894 
Median 0.139 -1.263 5.659 0.148 -1.491 6.346 0.151 -1.415 5.617 
Max 0.349 -0.532 11.928 0.349 -0.661 11.546 0.334 -0.549 9.618 
          
 Panel D: t-statistics for the difference in mean values between the two periods 
Diff 0.090 0.059 -0.415 0.083 0.350 -1.682 0.079 0.399 -1.631 
t-stat 38.616 4.194 -7.988 43.441 33.462 -39.609 44.287 41.759 -43.171 
This table reports summary statistics for the S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral moments. The sample spans from 
January 1998 to December 2007 and includes 2,514 trading days, out of which 1,256 belong in the period 1998-2002 and 
1,258 belong in the period 2003-2007. 
30MFIV , 60MFIV , 91MFIV  is the 30-day, 60-day and 91-day risk-neutral volatility, 
respectively; 
30SKEW ,  60SKEW  and 91SKEW  is the 30-day, 60-day and 91-day risk-neutral skewness, respectively; 
30KURT , 60KURT  and 91KURT  is the 30-day, 60-day and 91-day risk-neutral kurtosis, respectively. Panel A presents 
summary statistics for the whole sample period (1998-2007), Panel B presents summary statistics for the first period 
(1998-2002), Panel C presents summary statistics for the second period (2003-2007) and Panel D presents t-statistics for 
the difference in mean values between the two periods. Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors are employed to 
estimate the t-statistics in Panels A, B and C, while White (1980) robust standard errors are employed to estimate the t-
statistics in Panel D.  
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Table 5 
Variable characteristics allocated on groups formed using information based on orthogonalized MDLI measures 
  Ahead
30  
Calls
3  
Puts
3  60MFIV  60SKEW  60KURT  91MFIV  91SKEW  91KURT    
            
                  SP500
,t  Panel A: Sorting based on the market default-risk measure after removing the effect of the S&P 500 index ( tSP500 ) 
LOW -0.016 0.120 0.147 0.144 0.161 -1.504 6.405 0.165 -1.405 5.679   
 0.005 0.200 0.220 0.218 0.244 -1.178 4.773 0.243 -1.041 4.108   
HIGH 0.032 0.229 0.232 0.229 0.255 -0.985 4.265 0.252 -0.906 3.832   
Diff. 
(t-stat) 
0.048 
(108.11) 
0.109 
(31.53) 
0.085 
(42.46) 
0.085 
(39.71) 
0.093 
(36.27) 
0.519 
(49.88) 
-2.140 
(-52.18) 
0.087 
(37.47) 
0.499 
(50.69) 
-1.847 
(-47.85)  
 
             
                (hist)
,
 t  Panel B: Sorting based on the market default-risk measure after removing the effect of the 30-days historical volatility (
Hist
t,30 ) 
LOW -0.011 0.152 0.181 0.178 0.202 -1.394 5.752 0.203 -1.254 4.930   
 0.002 0.153 0.169 0.166 0.185 -1.332 5.727 0.187 -1.262 5.237   
HIGH 0.024 0.217 0.223 0.220 0.245 -1.019 4.402 0.244 -0.931 3.911   
Diff. 
(t-stat) 
0.035 
(55.34) 
0.065 
(17.86) 
0.042 
(17.94) 
0.042 
(17.53) 
0.044 
(15.53) 
0.375 
(32.17) 
-1.350 
(29.16) 
0.040 
(15.26) 
0.323 
(31.07) 
-1.019 
(-27.18)  
 
             
                  VIX
,t
 Panel C: Sorting based on the market default-risk measure after removing the effect of the CBOE VIX index (
1VIX t ) 
LOW -0.011 0.163 0.193 0.190 0.216 -1.358 5.513 0.217 -1.208 4.681   
 0.003 0.137 0.151 0.149 0.165 -1.400 6.123 0.168 -1.345 5.635   
HIGH 0.024 0.216 0.221 0.218 0.242 -1.002 4.382 0.240 -0.917 3.909   
Diff. 
(t-stat) 
0.035 
(61.29) 
0.053 
(15.61) 
0.028 
(12.81) 
0.028 
(12.55) 
0.026 
(9.76) 
0.356 
(32.84) 
-1.131 
(26.18) 
0.023 
(9.19) 
0.291 
(29.34) 
-0.772 
(-22.61)  
 
             
                    all
,t  Panel D: Sorting based on the market default-risk measure after removing the effect of: tSP500 , 
Hist
t,30 and 1VIX t  
LOW -0.016 0.119 0.147 0.143 0.161 -1.506 6.415 0.164 -1.407 5.688   
 0.005 0.201 0.220 0.218 0.244 -1.175 4.760 0.243 -1.038 4.097   
HIGH 0.032 0.229 0.233 0.229 0.255 -0.984 4.260 0.252 -0.905 3.828   
Diff. 
(t-stat) 
0.048 
(108.37) 
0.110 
(31.71) 
0.086 
(42.64) 
0.086 
(39.92) 
0.094 
(36.36) 
0.522 
(50.50) 
-2.155 
(-52.63) 
0.088 
(37.53) 
0.502 
(51.70) 
-1.860 
(-48.38)  
 
             
This table reports the group mean values of variables created using information of the MDLI measure, EV
r
t
Merton, , orthogonalized on the following set of variables: the level 
of the S&P 500 index, tSP500 , the 30-day historical volatility, 
Hist
t,30 , and the one-day lagged VIX level, 1VIX t . The option-related variables include the 30-day-ahead 
realized volatility, 
Ahead
t,30 , the mean implied volatility of at-the-money calls belonging in delta moneyness category 3, 
Calls
t,3 , the mean implied volatility of at-the-money 
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puts belonging in delta moneyness category 3, 
Puts
t,3 , and the 60- and 91-day risk-neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis ( 60MFIV , 60SKEW , 60KURT , 91MFIV ,
91SKEW  and 91KURT  respectively). Panel A presents the mean values of variables for groups formed using 
SP500
,t , which is the residual from regressing 
EV r
t
Merton,  on 
tSP500 . Likewise, Panel B and Panel C present the mean values of variables for groups formed using 
(Hist)
,
 t  and 
VIX
,t , which are the residuals from regressing 
EV r
t
Merton,  
on Histt,30  and 1VIX t , respectively. Finally, Panel D presents the mean values of variables for groups formed using 
all
,t , which is the residual from regressing 
EV r
t
Merton,  on 
tSP500 , 
Hist
t,30  and 1VIX t  (all at once). The first three lines of figures of each panel present the mean values of each variable for the LOW (orthogonalized 
EV r
t
Merton,  values 
less than 50
th
 percentile), MEDIUM (orthogonalized EV
r
t
Merton, values between the 50
th
 and 80
th
 percentiles) and HIGH (orthogonalized EV
r
t
Merton, values greater than 80
th
 
percentile) groups, respectively.  The fourth (fifth) line of each panel, present the numerical difference (t-statistics) between the values of the LOW and HIGH portfolios. 
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Table 6 
Correlation coefficients between the S&P 500 Index option-implied risk-neutral moments and economic variables 
  tMFIV ,60  tSKEW ,60  tKURT ,60  tMON  tIdxMom  1VIX t  1IdxVol t  tTbMom  tA-B  1OptVol t
 
tBWsent  tNBP  tRET  
EV r
t
Merton,  
tMFIV ,60   0.651 -0.838 0.003 0.266 0.049 0.007 -0.485 0.676 0.004 -0.426 -0.479 -0.068 0.711 
tSKEW ,60  0.636  -0.928 0.023 0.157 0.026 -0.006 -0.352 0.418 -0.011 -0.121 -0.484 -0.060 0.785 
tKURT ,60  -0.788 -0.936  -0.019 -0.265 -0.048 -0.001 0.430 -0.571 0.002 0.248 0.535 0.081 -0.810 
tMON  0.003 0.022 -0.020  -0.006 -0.105 -0.194 0.045 0.007 -0.092 -0.006 0.011 0.003 0.005 
tIdxMom  0.358 0.225 -0.281 -0.003  0.120 0.015 -0.040 0.224 0.013 -0.032 -0.594 -0.235 0.175 
1VIX t  0.062 0.033 -0.048 -0.078 0.148  0.022 0.010 0.020 0.090 0.008 -0.067 0.004 0.003 
1IdxVol t  0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.178 0.015 0.069  -0.027 0.022 0.478 -0.004 0.003 0.012 0.001 
tTbMom  -0.481 -0.298 0.358 0.032 -0.132 0.013 -0.006  -0.364 -0.021 -0.006 0.169 0.018 -0.286 
tA-B  0.318 0.171 -0.243 0.021 0.181 0.019 -0.012 -0.202  0.014 -0.309 -0.347 -0.061 0.476 
1OptVol t  0.005 -0.009 0.001 -0.095 0.012 0.099 0.514 -0.008 0.020  -0.005 0.008 0.010 -0.005 
tBWsent  -0.427 -0.182 0.323 -0.007 -0.018 0.006 -0.003 0.016 -0.169 -0.001  0.148 -0.016 -0.155 
tNBP  -0.450 -0.483 0.532 0.006 -0.475 -0.063 0.000 0.164 -0.131 0.007 0.215  0.162 -0.482 
tRET  -0.077 -0.053 0.072 -0.003 -0.256 0.005 0.016 0.006 -0.051 0.005 -0.017 0.142  -0.019 
EV r
t
Merton,  0.701 0.704 -0.687 0.005 0.222 0.000 -0.001 -0.304 0.170 -0.002 -0.171 -0.378 0.001  
               
VIF --- --- --- 1.040 1.431 1.042 1.392 1.142 1.108 1.368 1.101 1.498 1.080 1.285 
               
This table reports the Pearson’s correlations (lower diagonal) and Spearman’s rank correlations (upper diagonal) between variables for the period 1998-2007. Definitions of the economic 
determinants are provided in Section 4.4 of the manuscript. The bottom of the table reports the variance inflation factor (VIF) which is used for co-linearity diagnostic between the variables 
used as predictors in the multivariate regression analysis. 
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Table 7 
Regression analysis: MDLI as an economic determinant of the S&P 500 Index 
risk-neutral moments  
 60MFIV  60SKEW  60KURT  91MFIV  91SKEW  91KURT  
                                   Panel A: First period (1998-2002) 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
1ty  0.943*** 0.467*** 0.538*** 0.927*** 0.389*** 0.401*** 
2ty  0.030 0.420*** 0.354*** 0.049* 0.385*** 0.371*** 
EV r
t
Merton,  3.184*** 5.969*** -35.374*** 2.783*** 3.195** -19.359*** 
       
Adj. R2 0.956 0.712 0.732 0.960 0.490 0.490 
       
                                      Panel B: Second period (2003-2007) 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
1ty  0.863*** 0.627*** 0.636*** 0.849*** 0.559*** 0.572*** 
2ty  0.124*** 0.329*** 0.299*** 0.139*** 0.358*** 0.317*** 
EV r
t
Merton,  2.409*** 8.113** -38.486*** 2.055*** 9.414** -41.175*** 
       
Adj. R2 0.975 0.884 0.840 0.979 0.788 0.729 
This table reports the results for regression models that investigate the relation between risk-neutral moments 
and the market default likelihood index (MDLI) for the periods 1998–2002 (Panel A) and 2003–2007 (Panel 
B). The dependent variables are as follows: 
60MFIV  ( 91MFIV ) is the 60-day (91-day) risk-neutral volatility,  
60SKEW  ( 91SKEW ) is the 60-day (91-day) risk-neutral skewness, and 60KURT  ( 91KURT ) is the 60-day (91-
day) risk-neutral kurtosis, computed at time t. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation according to Newey and West (1987). Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Regression analysis: Economic determinants of the S&P 500 Index option 
implied risk-neutral moments  
 60MFIV  60SKEW  60KURT  91MFIV  91SKEW  91KURT  
                                   Panel A: First period (1998-2002) 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
1ty  0.790*** 0.439*** 0.476*** 0.726*** 0.368*** 0.352*** 
2ty  0.192*** 0.421*** 0.366*** 0.260*** 0.368*** 0.340*** 
tMON  -0.001 0.031*** -0.084*** 0.000 0.015 -0.032 
tIdxMom  -0.004 0.117* -0.446** -0.002 0.126 -0.672*** 
1VIX t  0.144*** 0.844*** -3.212*** 0.176*** 0.553*** -1.895*** 
1IdxVol t  -0.001 0.027* -0.069 -0.001 0.029 -0.080 
tTbMom  -0.020 -0.500*** 0.585 -0.028** -0.417** 0.264 
tA-B  0.001 0.019** -0.093*** 0.001 0.015 -0.071** 
1OptVol t  0.001 -0.014 0.037 0.001* -0.021* 0.045* 
tBWsent  0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
tNBP  0.003*** -0.028** 0.107*** 0.003*** -0.039** 0.109** 
tRET  -0.694*** -1.027*** 7.573*** -0.564*** -0.535 4.202*** 
EV r
t
Merton,  3.054*** 3.406** -26.252*** 2.628*** 1.159 -11.574*** 
tRET  *
EV r
t
Merton,  -14.453** 6.726 -41.299 -13.297* 117.837 -161.287 
EV r
t
Merton,  0.748*** 0.012 -8.204 0.572*** -0.244 -8.157 
       
Adj. R2 0.982 0.728 0.767 0.981 0.506 0.527 
       
                                      Panel B: Second period (2003-2007) 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
1ty  0.889*** 0.61*** 0.581*** 0.762*** 0.529*** 0.523*** 
2ty  0.098 0.317*** 0.311*** 0.225*** 0.342*** 0.306*** 
tMON  -0.001*** 0.025*** -0.061 -0.001* 0.023** -0.098* 
tIdxMom  0.003 -0.325** 1.170* 0.002 -0.196 0.148 
1VIX t  0.055 0.956** -6.718*** 0.131*** 1.26*** -6.732*** 
1IdxVol t  -0.002 0.014 -0.019 -0.001 0.012 -0.043 
tTbMom  -0.012 -0.323** 0.732 -0.009 -0.362** 0.663 
tA-B  0.000 -0.006 -0.015 0.000 0.005 -0.061 
1OptVol t  0.000 -0.012 0.007 0.000 -0.009 0.011 
tBWsent  0.000 0.002 -0.015 0.000 0.003 -0.017 
tNBP  0.001*** -0.024** 0.199*** 0.001** -0.037** 0.241*** 
tRET  -0.835*** -4.867*** 23.779*** -0.688*** -4.671*** 21.044*** 
EV r
t
Merton,  2.981*** 12.162*** -52.95*** 2.512*** 11.776*** -45.246*** 
tRET  *
EV r
t
Merton,  -15.153** -238.518*** 1,601.65*** -13.136** -300.189*** 1,491.851*** 
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EV r
t
Merton,  0.512* 14.448*** -85.939*** 0.509** 19.647*** -90.913*** 
       
Adj. R2 0.992 0.900 0.862 0.991 0.810 0.755 
This table reports the results for regression models that investigate the relation between risk-neutral moments 
and a set of economic determinants for the periods 1998–2002 (Panel A) and 2003–2007 (Panel B). The 
dependent variables are as follows: 
60MFIV  ( 91MFIV ) is the 60-day (91-day) risk-neutral volatility,  60SKEW  (
91SKEW ) is the 60-day (91-day) risk-neutral skewness, and 60KURT  ( 91KURT ) is the 60-day (91-day) risk-
neutral kurtosis, computed at time t. Definitions of the economic determinants are provided in Section 4.4 of 
the manuscript. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation according to Newey 
and West (1987). Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
